Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar In Indian Philosophical Analysis

Description

This landmark classic marks the beginning of a new approach to Indian philosophy. While older approaches were born from the assumption that critical thinking was unknown to the East and all philosophical endeavor was assumed to be a manifestation of religious doctrine or a form of mysticism, Matilal brilliantly succeeds in dispelling these assumptions and so opens up the rich traditions of Indian philosophical analysis to the modern reader.

Is reality actually knowable and therefore expressible in language? Matilal locates his analysis in this central debate and brings in Indian philosophical texts as pivotal, canonical statements of epistemological and methodological relevance. This edition incorporates additions and changes made by Matilal in his personal copy. Edited and with a preface by Jonardon Ganeri, the volume is a lucid introduction to the varied legacy of Indian philosophical analysis.

About the Authors

Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-91) was Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, All Souls College, Oxford.

Jonardon Ganeri is Recurrent Visiting Professor of Philosophy, King's College London, and Global Professor, New York University.

Table of contents

Preface to the New Edition: J. Ganeri
Preface to the First Edition
Chronological Table of Philosophers
l. Perception and Language
1.1. General remarks on the problem
1.2. Early Nyaáya theory of perception
1.3. The rise of idealism
1.4. Bhartrhari's theory of knowledge: 'Construction'(vikalpa)
1.5. Dińága's theory of perception
1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha)
1.7. Dińńaga and modem reductionism
2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception
2.1. A critique of the Dińńaga school
2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents
2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (sāmavāya)
2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors'
2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms
2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference
2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (jāti)
2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception
2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-nyāya: 'Simple' properties
2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions
3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics
3.1. Preliminary remarks
3.2. The notion of 'substance' : Pānini's rule 1.2.64
3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': Pānini's rule 5.1.119
3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vyādi and Vājapyāyana
3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance'
3.6. Vyādi's theory of meaning
3.7. An analysis of Vyādi's theory in modem terminology
4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic
4.1. Non-referring expressions in language
4.2. The riddle of 'non-being'
4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic
4.4. The Nyāya-Buddhist controversy
4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy
4.6. The implicit Nyāya semantic principle
4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation
4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism
5. Negation and the Mādhyamika Dialectic
5.1. The Mādhyamika attitude-'emptiness'
5.2. Two levels of truth
5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world
5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness'
5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes
5.6. Two aspects of negation
5.7. 'Mysticism' and the Mādhyamika school
Bibliographical References
Index